paying rent of Rs 360/- per annum for one room but paying Rs.7260 per annum to DTH TV

Due to Maharashtra Rent act old tenants in Mumbai pay rent of Rs 360/- per annum for one room but pay Recharge of Rs.7260 per annum to DTH TV

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  •  The Maharashtra govt has made a law in 1950 s that rent cant b increased so tenants of those days r paying 65 years old rent but paying for everything at current price so the result is landlord are ruined as well as buildings r falling as landlord cant afford to repair. .

RIGHT TO PARK IS NOT AN EASEMENTARY RIGHT.................................... The Delhi High Court

RIGHT TO PARK IS NOT AN EASEMENTARY RIGHT The Delhi High Court on Friday, September 18, 2015 in Surabhi Gehlot Vs. Swarn Kanta Punj held that the right to park is not an easementary right. Such a right, in the absence of any inclusion as part of the terms of the lease cannot be read into the lease as an implied term of the tenancy. A bench comprising of Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Deepa Sharma observed that a tenant is entitled to only such rights that would be reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the tenancy.

Right to Easement of Parking

A previous judgment of Delhi High Court in Shri Akesh Kumar Jain v. Shri Harmeet Singh Bakshi 2001(59) DRJ 734 also held to the same effect that the tenant would be entitled to only such rights that would be reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the tenancy.

“The question is whether the requirement of parking a car in the drive way be considered as an implied term or a right of enjoyment of the tenancy? In our view the answer to the same is in the negative.”
the Court referred.

The plaintiff urges her right to easement of parking by virtue of Section 15 of the Easements Act. Section 15 of the Act states as follows:

“15. Acquisition by prescription:- Where the access and use of light or air and for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith, as an easement, without interruption, and for twenty years, And where support from one person’s land or things affixed thereto, has been peaceably received by another person’s land subjected to artificial pressure, or by things affixed thereto, as an easement, without interruption, and for twenty years, And where a right of way or any other easement has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto, as an easement and as of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, The right to such access and use of light or air, support, or other easement, shall be absolute.

Each of the said periods of twenty years shall be taken to be a period ending within two years next before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates is contested.”
Allowing the appeal filed by the defendants the High Court held that while the plaintiff has a right to access the premises, there is no easementary right to park her car in the demised premises. The right to easement of parking, if such a right were to exist, asserted as acquired by prescription in the present case, is a particular form of easement.

In other words, it is a specific extent of a right of easement. Before the Court can answer whether there is such a specific right of easement of parking over the demised premises, the Court must first answer the more fundamental question, i.e. whether in the present circumstances, any right of easement can arise in the first instance. In other words, the right of an easement of parking presupposes that the core essentials for a valid easement have already been met and satisfied.

Contentions of Parties

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants put up an iron gate at the opening of the passage leading to the demised premises, thereby obstructing her passage to the premises by car and parking the same in the open space adjacent to the demised premises. The defendant/appellants argued that the plaintiff had in no way been denied access or impeded in her approach to the demised premises; only that she cannot access the premises by car and/or park her car in the open space.

The primary contention of the plaintiff in this regard is that her right to park is a right of easement by prescription by virtue of Section 15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. To this effect she filed an application, seeking an interim injunction that would have the same effect, i.e. restrain the defendants from interfering with her right to park in front of the demised premises.

Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog, learned Counsel for the defendant, contends that the plaint is liable to be rejected on two grounds; namely, Order VII Rule 11 (a) -i.e that it does not disclose a cause of action; and secondly Order VII Rule 11 (d), i.e that it is barred by law, specifically, the Indian Easements Act.

He argues that it is not the plaintiff’s case that a right to park in the open space was a part of the tenancy, but merely that this right had accrued to her absolutely by virtue of the Indian Easements Act. As a result of this singular ground of claim, he argues that the plaint must be rejected as it is a settled position of law that the right of parking cannot be termed an easementary right.

Further, learned counsel argues that the learned Single Judge erroneously allowed the respondent to lead evidence to project that the right to park was a part of the terms of the lease.

The defendant argued that since it is a matter of well settled law that a right to parking is a valuable right, and not an easementary right, the plaintiff’s insistence on claiming it as an easement, makes the plaint liable to be rejected on the ground that there exists no cause of action.

It was further argued that the suit averments nowhere set up a claim of exclusive use of the right to park; rather the plaintiff’s complaint is that the use permitted by the defendant’s predecessor-in-interest has resulted in an obligation to continue granting such permission.

It was also argued that there is no term in the lease document which entitles the lessee to claim use of the kind sought in the suit. Impugning the order granting the interim injunction, the defendants argued that (1) no right of easement can be asserted by a tenant against his own landlord, (2) that a right of access to the said premises can in no way be construed as a right to an easement of parking over the same (3) that the plea of accretion can also not be pressed against the landlord for the simple reason that the plea is with regard to land that already belongs to the appellants.

The claim for any term entitling the plaintiff to use any land for parking may not be part of a written lease between a landlord and tenant and the absence of a written document of lease placed on record by the plaintiff she can still prove it during evidence when the trial begins that the terms of lease included the right to park the car also at the open space outside her tenanted premises which also formed part of the tenanted premises.