Sunday, July 21, 2013

McDonalds vs Niamat Anand case: What landlords can learn

Jul 19, 2013, 02.00 PM IST

McDonalds vs Niamat Anand case: What landlords can learn

According to Harish Salve, one should agree in advance that if one overstays, they will pay for damages on the basis of market rate of the property as fixed in the ready reckoner which will save the landlord from running around getting valuation reports, putting expert witnesses.

McDonalds vs Niamat Anand case: What landlords can learn
We must encourage alternate dispute resolution clauses that have compact remedy
Harish Salve
Sr Advocate
Supreme Court
McDonalds was in for a big shock earlier this month after Delhi High Court asked the fast food giant to vacate in 8 weeks its 3-storey restaurant at India's most expensive high street, Khan Market in Lutyens Delhi to vacate a restaurant it had been running for 13 years at India's most expensive high street Khan Market.


The penalty has caused a ripple in the realty circle. In what is being seen as a landmark judgment for lease renewals and the rental market at large, the Delhi High Court ruled against McDonalds, finding the multinational to have overstayed as an unwelcome tenant since February 2010 and ordered.

The High Court instructed McDonalds to retrospectively pay a rent nearly 200 percent higher from February 2010. McDonalds has been directed to pay Rs 11 lakh a month and 12.5 percent interest from February 2010, as against Rs 3.5 lakh it had been paying as monthly rent. The Court had taken the prevailing market rates to fix that amount.

McDonalds lost the case to a 92-year old widow Niamat Kaur Anand, who since the lease expiry in 2010 had been fighting to reclaim her property. Anand was represented by her son's childhood friend and legal eagle Harish Salve. McDonalds had moved the Delhi High Court after losing an arbitration, which had been awarded by former justice AP Shah. The Delhi High Court had upheld the arbitration award.

Experts say a precedent has been created not just over the penalty or mean profits that has been levied on multinational tenant but also on the basis of which a tenant and a landlord can interpret contract clauses to renew a lease deed. In this particular case the lease deed was for a period of nine years with rent to be increased after 5 years at 25 percent over the last rent paid.

Problems arose in 2009 when Anand indicated to McDonalds that it should pay a higher rent as per the market rates in case it wants to renew the lease. The company responded by signing a 'letter of intent' allegedly signed by Kaur in 2001, saying she had agreed to let out the premises for 18 years. The company also questioned the rationale behind her decision to increase the rent, saying such a steep hike isn't agreeable to it.

Justice Shah in the arbitration award, subsequently upheld by the Delhi HC, concluded that the registered lease deed dated February 12, 2001 was for nine years while a letter cited by McDonalds as an agreement to extend the lease by another nine years, "is merely an offer" and therefore, not a concluded legal contract.

In an interview to CNBC-TV18 Harish Salve shared views on how will this case impact lease deeds going forward and clauses that tenants and landlords must insist upon in a contract.

Below is the verbatim transcript of Harish Salve's interview on CNBC-TV18

Q: Landlords normally feel safer letting out properties to multinational companies (MNCs). Why has this McDonalds case according to you set an important precedent? Is it only because of the penalty or because there was an arbitration clause in the lease deed which is not a common practice?

A: It is good in the time scale that we have seen because there was a big problem which became exactly the reverse of the intention of the law makers. They exempted properties over three and half thousand per month from rent control because those kind of tenants who can afford to pay that is not what the rent control law is meant for.

Like in Mumbai if you are a company with a share capital of more than Rs 1 crore then you are not protected by the Rent Act. Now the problem is, the Rent Act courts actually were faster so one should file a suit for possession and the suit for possession takes forever in our legal system.

Therefore, landlords are always struggling to get their property back if the tenants turn around and set some kind of defence and say alright, I lose the case but at least I have the property for the next ten years. This is a good format that insists on a good arbitration clause when you are letting properties to large companies.
 
Q: Since land and property is normally seen as the state subject, can you explain whether this case creates a precedent only in New Delhi or Pan India? For instance, each state has its own rent act which will then have to be factored in all of these lease deeds?

A: No. Anywhere in India, a lease ultimately is a matter of contract. Even if you are writing a rent note and you don’t want to execute a formal lease, I would advice people to have an arbitration clause saying it will go to arbitration of an arbitrator to be appointed jointly by parties.

If the parties fail to appoint the court appoints arbitrator which is a short cut proceeding. An arbitrator is appointed and then the matter goes on. So, at least you get a degree from the arbitrator within a finite period of time. If one has a good arbitrator it is definitely finite period of time.

Q: According to you, what all should tenants insist upon while taking up a property?

A: Must have is a clear clause in which there must be, if there is a renewal clause it must provide the manner in which the renewal is to be exercised. Two, it should say that the lease is a complete contract and no other writing whether before or after shall constitute any contract for renewal save and accept in accordance with the lease. Third, which should be provided is an arbitration clause.

Q: While litigation is very popular in India, arbitration isn't, especially when we talk about landlords and tenants. So even if the two parties were to look at this, any clauses that they must include within the arbitration clause?

A: I had a clause in the arbitration clause saying the arbitrator shall award cost on well settled principles. In England if one ran a false defence, one would have to pay huge cost. I have seen cost orders in England running into millions of pounds for running a false case. We don’t do that in India and that is why litigation drags on and on and people carry on merrily. We must encourage such alternate dispute resolution clauses that have compact remedy.

Q: We have covered tenants, what about landlords? What is your advice for those looking to let out property?

A: When landlords are drawing up leases, unfortunately in India we have given up the practice of drawing up a proper lease deed. There are standard templates, one can virtually Google them and find out. There are standard templates with clauses for handing over possession, clauses for keeping the properties in good repair, properties clauses for paying rent rates and out goings, clauses for forfeiture, for misuse, renewal clauses.

These are in any template of a lease. Landlords, who want to be sensible, should not try and shortcut and save money on stamp duty. The biggest thing in our favour was a registered lease. Have a registered lease, it is worth the investment.

Q: According to you, a registered lease deed is a must. But is that ammunition enough for a landlord to reclaim property? It is never going to be quick, but can it help in speeding up the process?

A: There is nothing one can do to prevent a man who is staying in your house from not vacating. What one can and must do is, one must provide the mean profits will be paid on market value, which in any case is the law. So, once tenants realise that they are not going to get a free or a discounted ride for their period of overstay, they will end up paying current market values and there will be trouble.

Media can run a circular or a ready reckoner rate of properties. Landlords would benefit immensely from that and it will then become an acceptable evidence because the advantage of an arbitration is that one does not have to follow the strict rules of the law of evidence or strict rules of go to procedure to prove something.

If it has a good ready reckoner of property, it will be the other thing. In this case fortunately, the landlady had a quotation from another person who was interested in her property. We produced that person and they send somebody who flew down here and said here was our offer. She has actually got the rent she would have got from a back date.

Q: Are you saying that it should be an agreement to have mean profits and damages that must be agreed upon at the time of signing the lease deed?

A: One should agree in advance that if one overstay, you will pay me damages on the basis of market rate of this property as fixed in the ready reckoner published by X or Y. At least the landlord then does not have to go running around getting valuation reports, putting expert witnesses in the box and one can cross-examine a person and then it becomes chancellor’s foot. Should it be five, six, four, valuation is always this. This is a clause which can be put into the lease deeds. If there is a good ready reckoner that somebody takes on to publish, we will go by the average market quotation and so you can agree that in advance.

Q: If the two parties agree to ready reckoners, will it be fair for a tenant to go to a landlord during a property downcycle and say reduce my rent, the market is down, rentals have fallen?

A: One, you have to make a distinction between two periods one is the currency of the lease, the other is post lease. During the currency of the lease it is a matter of contractual negotiation whether somebody wants a flexible rent or a fix rent. It is like if you want to take a mortgage, you have to take a call.

Do you want flexible rates of interest or fix rates of interest, sometime one loses, sometimes the other loses. Many times landlords want certainty of income. They are happy if they get this much income for a period of three years. So, you have a fixed lease during the currency of the lease. There has never been a problem about the currency of the lease, the problem arises post that.

It takes five years to get your premises back. How much will you be compensated in damages for that five years of overstay, becomes very difficult for a landlord to prove, what is the current market rate and you also know market rate is never really reflected in full cheque payments and so, it gets difficult to prove the current market rate.

Friday, July 19, 2013

View of choke



Illegally parked car





when bmc unpreparedness for


early monsoon costs citizens




Hall  board

Friday, July 12, 2013

If courts are not delaying and banks give Loan for development ...



If courts do not delay and banks give Loan for development ...then I can build a small good hospital for residents of Santacruz East where I am born, brought up, loved,and I love my Mumbai  and progressed. But......the rent act, courts, the banks who dont mind financing King fisher Mallaya 1000s of crores, dont finance landlords so I am forced to offer the building for sale:


On Sale : SABURI :


SANTACRUZ
Co-Owner: Alok Tholiya & two others from family
Saburi, 107,
Vakola  Bridge, Vakola,
S’cruz – East.
Mumbai – 400 055.
                               9324225699
                               tholiya@hotmail.com

A prime business center: (Mumbai’s biggest Marble, Granite,                      Bathroom fittings market)
                               2nd Bus Stop from Santacruz – East Railway Station.
1 minutes drive from Vakola Highway Signal.
5 minutes drive from Santacruz Airport.
                               5 minutes drive from 7 Star deluxe Hotel Grand Hyatt, Santacruz .
                               15 minutes drive from International Airport,
                               15 minutes drive from and Bandra- Kurla Complex
                               15 minutes drive from newly coming up Diamond Market.
                               15 minutes drive from Bandra Terminus.
                                Vakola is well connected to central railways too.

Housing  old building of 1942
 ground + 1 Story Building.  There r roads on east , west and north side.
Owner owns plot, with building.
Freehold land.
Owner occupies: Entire ground floor in building with outhouse.
 The building has two tenants and one trespasser.
1.Mrs. Bina Chowdhuri (  Runs Bharat Lodge but is in shambles and not run properly . Has filed false case in 1990 claiming terrace and ensures that matter does not reach board when we r present but in our absence  they keep taking some kind of delaying orders.
2.Mrs. Chowgule: Runs a tobacco stall made in open space of building. Rent is just Rs 40/- but do not pay same. Earn Rs. 40000/- from this place and have several other income sources.

3.Trespasser: Mr. Kishan Singh Chohan runs hotel from unauthorized shade without licence  but still has illegally obtained police licence, was fined by Reliance energy for using illegally taken residential power in hotel, hotel is not having any fire fighting preparedness, no cleanliness, no separate wash room , no separate kitchen etc still due to backing of one Suresh Thakur of Congress is protected by BMC.

Plot size 406 Sq. Mts.,
 But someone says: about 40 mts may go in road widening
NA Commercial. Zone R.
Title 100% clear.
CTS no. 3792 to 3796


PL. advise before I am slapped with a notice of contempt....Alok


One of family member of  tenant has done higher studies and spent several lacs. They spent another few lacs for treatment in costliest hospital for one of their family member. Own several cars, laptops, mobiles, TV, bungalow, travel to US and Hongkong frequently. But their advocate just uttered words in court that his client was poor and did not have enough money so court decided mesne profit as Rs 1000/- per month. People in Mumbai pay more then that as parking charges, as maids salary etc.. 

Same court was given supporting rent agreement papers of building around this tenant but court said that landlord should have also given valuers certificate. Firstly has courts set a rule / list of valid documents to be given as supporting documents?? No! Then how can a court refuse to accept any document which is registered with registrar and ask for other supporting document when they have never prescribed / issued list of documents required to prove a point. 

Secondly while court refused to accept tenancy agreement on one hand but only verbal false statement was accepted by same court that tenant is unable  to pay higher / market mesne profit and court did not ask tenant to substantiate their claim by producing their IT papers, net-worth, bills of Mobile, electricity, car ownership etc etc.. 

Also I hv come across first case of mesne profit but my advocate must hv come across same hundreds of time. But did he advise me on getting all those supporting documents which courts expect? No. Did I get opportunity file those ?? No. Did I get opportunity to insist that tenant must give supporting documents to substantiate his claim that he can't afford to pay higher mesne profit? No. 

So by giving these facts am I committing contempt of court??? 
Tenant has already field contempt and exonerated that I had an opportunity to go to higher court in appeal. 
1. I had ailing father and who just expired. 
2. I can prove thru my IT papers that my income is not sufficient to bear expenses of higher courts.
3. I have to work hard for earning two square meals and thus can not just remain seated on benches of courts which keep giving adjournments. 
4.  I have lot of social responsibilities and I am meant for honest good work and activism and has to keep time for same. I am not the one who will squeeze all facilities given of society and give nothing in return. 
5. I need time for my health and family. 
6. I hv to work hard to pay so many taxes and duties and levies imposed by govt, BMC, and others. 
So I can not be just expected to keep going in appeal for callous orders and managing (system to their end) advocates. So why can't I raise my grievance on blogs and mails. After all I am not lying like my tenant and his advocate!! And this I can do without any expenses and without affecting my other routine pressures like I am blogging right now when it is 3.24 am. Where as courts will call me at peak hours, pay to advocates, their assistants , then many others as per their advise , pay for typing, xeroxing , get no parking , staircases and toilets are stinking and breeding deadly infections, there r more then 60 - 70 matters per session , yet matter is kept back and finally get adjournment without transacting anything. 
I am saying everything which I can prove but it seems still same is contempt of court. So can one conclude that presenting facts is contempt and lying is not. 

Requesting all with folded hands thee the wise-men of present society to advise me. 

Hence forth main users will have to shoulder some responsibilities of common work

Alok Tholiya,
Marigold Hall, Tholiya Bhavan, 10th Road, Next to Regency Hotel,
Near  Vakola Highway Signal, Santacruz East, Mumbai – 400 055
Tel. 9324225699 / atholiya@gmail.com





15th July  2013

The Reliance Energy,
Bandra East,
Mumbai



Dear Sir,

Namaskar.

Reg: Common Electric connection account no. 101141559

Request: above meter will be used by residents of first floor and its payment and other responsibility will be with Purohits or Shri I C Jain

Pl. find a copy of letter to purohit and Shri I C Jain, residents of Tholiya Bhavan, 1st Fl., 10th Rd, Santacruz East, Mumbai 400055. The letter is self explanatory and therefore it is made clear to your esteemed dept that you will have to be directly in touch with these named residents and actual users for any of your issues related with these residents and with above connection.

Also Hope you will do the needful.

Thanking you in anticipation,

Sincerely yours

Alok Tholiya

Encl: AS ABOVE

Intimation to BMC on water issues of common meter

Alok Tholiya,
Marigold Hall, Tholiya Bhavan, 10th Road, Next to Regency Hotel,
Near  Vakola Highway Signal, Santacruz East, Mumbai – 400 055
Tel. 9324225699 / atholiya@gmail.com





15th July  2013

The A.E. W.W.,
H/east , Santacruz east, Mumbai 400055
Tel . No. 26125849/26182217



Dear Sir,

Namaskar.

Reg: Common water connection no. HEA6780003

Request: above meter will be used by residents of first floor and its payment and other responsibility will be with Purohits or Shri I C Jain

Pl. find a copy of letter to purohit and Shri I C Jain, residents of Tholiya Bhavan, 1st Fl., 10th Rd, Santacruz East, Mumbai 400055. The letter is self explanatory and therefore it is made clear to your esteemed dept that you will have to be directly in touch with these named residents and actual users for any of your issues related with these residents and with above connection.

Also Hope you will do the needful.

Thanking you in anticipation,

Sincerely yours

Alok Tholiya

Encl: AS ABOVE

To, Defaulters residents and their names will appear on notice boards

11/07/2013
To, residents of 1st Fl., Tholiya Bhavan.

Brief history: As informed in past by residents of Tholiya Bhavan ( and some of the documents with us: That one ground floor tenant had disconnected water supply of first floor residents, demolished the WC on terrace , and caused several other hardships. Shri M C Jain and Shri N M Thakkar and others joined hands and got fresh connection. It is told that Shri N K Purohit and Shri I C jain had played no role in securing fresh connections of water , filing court case for having new WC on 1st Floor, for wrongfully inducting one Khanna family on rooms of Guptaji etc etc.

Shri N M Thakar sahab maintained the common infrastructures and utilities for many years and since the time he shifted Shri B L Tholiya was doing so. Shri B L Tholiya had also given several free / complimentary facilities to Shri N K Purohit and Shri I C Jain family which  includes not taking advance payments for any common expenses, maintaining all common passages, lights water etc. Besides his phone, TV, fridge , rooms, etc were used for years free of charge and unhindered and unashamedly.

But when Mrs Saroj Tholiya  ( this is just few months  before her death )became old did not understand new generation and went in the room of Purohits then his grand daughter insultingly threw her out. Then daddy went for collection of common expense and again he was insulted by the granddaughter of this tenant. This very tenant had lost all his money in craze of making a film " Subah ka savera" and was in bad financial situation when Tholiya’s looked after him well. There were occasions when a tenant of first floor  used to come in mid night and ask for food from Mrs Tholiya saying Bhabhi Ji aaj subah se kuch khaya nahi hei. And that innocent lady having responsibility of 4 children, one father in law and a husband having limited resources still happily and smiling fed him.

Now in the year 10-11  due to old age and health Shri B L Tholiya wanted to handover responsibility handled by him for over 35 years to other first floor residents. He called a meeting but shamelessly none  from Purohits and I C Jains turned up.

Finally he gave this  assignment to a staff of son’s organisation saying do it till I am alive and thereafter do whatever u like.

Now she too is not well and not getting any cooperation from these two beneficiary families.. Besides Madhukar Purohit and Jains have been insulting, not talking with due courtesy and not paying for common expenses or paying after fuss.

So Alok Tholiya and family the third family on first floor has separated his water and common electricity lines which he had to spend thousands but did it.
Finally today we handover the responsibility unilaterally to Shri I C Jain and Shri N K Purohit family members to manage following water and electricity connections if they want to continue to use them . All use, misuse, disuse, connection, disconnection, payments, maintenance or whatever is required will be their responsibility. Tholiya’s have their own common passage lighting which is exclusive for them.

Common Electric connection account no. 101141559
Common water connection no. HEA6780003

We shall be informing the electric and water dept that now on the B L tholiya and M C jain are not responsible for these connections.
By order

Encl: Xerox of latest bill copy as above
Outstanding from Purohit’s : Rs 4157/-
Outstanding from 1st April 2013 till date will be calculated and informed shortly.
Outstanding of rent and other expenses of tenants and tresspassers will be displayed on notice board shorty as is done by most other societies and institutiona.

Saturday, July 6, 2013

How far system has been misused by tenants?

How far system has been misused by tenants?
1. One case file went missing and I had to knock doors up to 6 months and up to Supreme Court. So various methods are adopted by tenant to delay case. And matter is liberally adjourned.

2. Tenant went in appeal court but did not file papers for a year. Court did not say anything.

3. Then court fixed manse profit of Rs. 1000/- p.m. . . . We had given copies of agreements of different leave and license in court. As per that rent prevailing in area comes to Rs. 10000/- and we had asked for Rs 5000. - Per month.  Court in order said we have not given valuer's report. Fine. But while responding to tenant that he can't afford higher rent court agreed that his daughters are studying and that he says he can't afford. There court did not say if u claim u can't afford then u have not given copy of ur ration card that which colour bears, that give ur IT return, etc ?? And in the suite we had already brought on record that tenant has a palatial bungalow in Jaipur , owns farm house, owns several cars, scooters, travels abroad several times in a year etc.. But court did not take all this in account and fixed rent of Rs.1000/- . Come with me in my area and u will find that in slums rate for 280 sq feet is Rs 5000/- p.m... But court is supreme and we have to respect court as else we will be put behind bars for challenging court the almighty.

4.  Then on silly ground they sought condonation of delay in paying even that paltry rent ( and as told earlier their advocates are one of the costliest in Bandra Small causes court)  inspite of court orders. We allowed it as that is what they wanted we object and then they will delay in arguments for years on their application for condonation. And court will allow that.

Wednesday, July 3, 2013

landlord who asked for rent killed by tenant

Landlords are shelter providers. When my grandfather and father landed in Mumbai they got a respectable shade above head with light and water and santation for a paltry rent. But due to rent act, bad press, delaying  courts now no one wants to provide affordable rental housing as due to over protection of tenants they have started behaving as devils and are killing, beating, abusing , harrassing, not paying landlords their dues. .....here is is case before you ....

 

किराया मांगने पर मकान मालिक का मर्डर

 

भजनपुरा।। नॉर्थ ईस्ट डिस्ट्रिक्ट के भजनपुरा इलाके में सोमवार देर रात किराया मांगने पर मकान मालिक की हत्या कर दी गई। मृतक की पहचान नंद किशोर मिश्रा (55) के रूप में हुई। हत्या का आरोप किराएदार पर है। वारदात के बाद किराएदार पत्नी और बच्चों के साथ मकान छोड़कर फरार हो गया था। पुलिस ने आरोपी किराएदार राजेश को गिरफ्तार कर लिया है।

पुलिस से मिली जानकारी के अनुसार नंद किशोर मिश्रा अपने दो बच्चों के साथ गंगोत्री विहार, यमुना विहार में रहते हैं। करीब सात साल पहले उनकी पत्नी की मौत हो गई थी। उनके मकान में ग्राउंड फ्लोर पर राजेश नामक शख्स अपने परिवार के साथ किराए पर रह रहा था। वह ग्रामीण सेवा टेंपो चलाता है। सोमवार रात 11 बजे के करीब मिश्रा किराएदार से किराया मांगने आए थे। आरोप है कि किराएदार ने उनका गला घोंटकर सिर दीवार में दे मारा, जिससे उनकी मौत हो गई।

हत्या करने के बाद जब वह शव को ठिकाने लगा रहा था ऐन वक्त पर मृतक की बहन शारदा वहां पहुंच गई। इससे पहले कि वह कुछ कर पाती वह पत्नी और बच्चों सहित मौके से फरार हो गया। मृतक की बहन ने वारदात की सूचना पुलिस को दी। पुलिस ने मौके पर पहुंचकर शव को कब्जे में लेकर पोस्टमॉर्टम के लिए भिजवाया। पुलिस ने वारदात की चश्मदीद गवाह मृतक की बहन के बयान पर हत्या का मुकदमा दर्ज कर आरोपी की तलाश शुरू कर दी।

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

Illegal car parking can get eviction

Bombay High Court
Bombay High Court
Moraji Goculdas Deoji Trust And ... vs Madhav Vithal Kudwa on 23 November, 1982
Equivalent citations: AIR 1983 Bom 68, 1983 (1) BomCR 272
Author: Pratap
Bench: S P Manohar
JUDGMENT
Pratap, J.
1. Arising for determination in this appeal by the original plaintiffs is a question of some importance under the
Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter the Act).
2. Since the year 1950 or so the defendant (respondent) herein has been plaintiff's tenant of room No. 18 on
the first floor of a building known as Morarji Goculdas Deoji Trust Building situated at Kennedy Bridge in
the city of Bombay. In or about October 1968, the defendant purchased a car which he commenced parking in
the open space of the compound of the said building. The plaintiffs objected. As many as three notices were
issued to remove the car from the said compound and cease parking it there. The plaintiffs thereupon filed the
instant suit for a declaration that the defendant, by parking his car in the compound, was committing trespass
and for permanent injunction restraining him from doing so. The defendant raised two defences viz, (a) he
was parking the car under express permission from one of the trustees; and (b) in any event, he had, under the
Act, a statutory right to do so. The trial Court negatived both these defences, held the defendant's action to
constitute a trespass and decreed the suit.
3. The defendant appealed to this Court. At the hearing, the trial Court's finding that the defendant had failed
to prove permission to park was not challenged. The learned single Judge hearing the appeal, however, held
that the ground floor open space in the compound of the building was "appurtenant" to the leased 'room on the
first floor within the meaning of S. 5(8)(b) of the Act and, therefore, "premises" as defined therein. It was also
held that parking car was an essential service within the meaning of S. 24(1) of the Act and the plaintiffs'
therefore, cannot cut off or withhold the same. The defendant was consequently held to have a statutory right
to park his car without any permission from the plaintiffs. The appeal was thus allowed, the trial Court's
decree was set aside and the suit dismissed. Hence, this appeal therefrom under the Letters Patent.
4. The plaintiffs are represented by their learned counsel Mr. K. J. Abhyankar. The defendant, though served,
has not chosen to appear.
5. Hearing the learned counsel Mr. Abhyankar and going through the impugned judgment and the relevant
provisions of the Act, we find ourselves unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the
learned single Judge. The question first arising for determination is :
Is the open space on the ground floor in the compound of the suit building "appurtenant" to the leased
premises viz, the room on the first floor within the meaning of S. 5(8) of the Act?
To the extent relevant, the said provision runs thus :
"'Premises' means --
.................. .................... ...................
(b) any building or part of a building let or given on licence separately (other than a farm building) including
---
Moraji Goculdas Deoji Trust And ... vs Madhav Vithal Kudwa on 23 November, 1982
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1704232/ 1(i) the garden, grounds, garages and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building.
........................ ......................... "
Now, though one wishes that on the question here the law was certain and succinct, it would, in the very
nature of things, not be possible to formulate a precise and singular test or a principle of universal application
for determining what is appurtenant. The diversity and the indeterminate nature of the term "appurtenant" and
colour, form and shape it can take from case to case can be very interesting indeed. It is a term of variable
import, scope and ambit. There can, therefore, be no fixed, invariable or strait-jacket approach or formula in
this regard. Besides, whether a thing is appurtenant and if so, to what extent, would be a mixed question of
fact and law. The resultant answer must, in each case, turn and depend upon the facts and circumstances of
that case and the context in which the question arises. Nevertheless, a look at the standard references should
be useful.
6. In Words And Phrases Judicially Defined (Butterworth & Co.) it is stated thus :
"The word 'appurtenances' has a distinct and definite meaning, and though it may be enlarged by the context,
yet the burden of proof lies on those who so contend. Prima facie, it imports nothing more than what is strictly
appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or grant, and which would, in truth, pass without being
specially mentioned."
On this aspect, a statement of the law in Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition, Volume 27, page 103
paragraph 130) can also assist:
"Meaning of 'house', 'messuage' and 'appurtenances'.
"By a lease of a 'house' outbuildings occupied with and necessary for the convenient occupation of the house
will pass. and also a courtyard, garden and orchard. 'Messuage' has the same meaning as 'house'. In the
expression 'house and premises', 'premises' refers only to matters intimately connected with the house. The
words 'with the appurtenances' do not extend the demise so as to include land or buildings which are used with
the demised property, but are not parcel of it; nor do they include a part of the building which has been
separated from it and has not been occupied with it for many years previous to the demise.
The words 'lands appertaining to' or 'lands belonging to' are more easily extended to land usually occupied
with the demised premises."
Yet another inkling in this field can be had from Woodfall's Law of Landlord and Tenant (Twentyeighth
Edition, Volume 1, 1979). Firstly at page 195.
"According to the current of the most recent decisions it would seem that nothing will pass under the word
'appurtenances' which would not equally pass by a conveyance of the principal subject-matter, without the
word 'appurtenances'."
And then at page 197:
"The word 'appurtenances' is not properly apt for the creation of a new right; but the word easily admits of a
secondary meaning, where the circumstances require, as equivalent to 'usually occupied'. Where a strip of
ground formed a convenient means of access to the back doors of a row of cottages which were in common
ownership, and the cottages were sold to different purchasers, each grant being of a cottage 'with the garden,
outbuildings and appurtenances' and including the part of the strip adjoining that cottage, it was held that the
right of way defendants facto enjoyed by the tenants up to the date of the conveyances passed by way of
express grant under the word 'appurtenances', although there was no made road over the strip."
Moraji Goculdas Deoji Trust And ... vs Madhav Vithal Kudwa on 23 November, 1982
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1704232/ 2The Oxford English Dictionary explains "appurtenance" as follows :---
"A thing that belongs to another, a 'belonging'; a minor property, right, or privilege, belonging to another more
important, and passing in possession with it; an appendage."
"A thing which naturally and fifty forms a subordinate part of, or belongs to, a whole system; a contributory
adjunct. an accessory."
And the word "appurtenant" is explained thus:
" belonging as a property or legal right; constituting a property or right subsidiary to one which is more
important."
"Appertaining as if by right; proper, suited, or appropriate to; relating, pertinent."
"A thing appertaining; a 'belonging.'"
The New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language explains the two terms "appurtenance" and
"appurtenant" as follows :--
" 'appurtenance' --- .......... a belonging, That which appertains, belongs, or is subordinate to something else; an
adjunct; an appendage. A right or feature belonging to a properly and passing with it if the property is sold."
" 'Appurtenant' --- ............. Appertaining or belonging having the effect of a legal accompaniment."
7. In the context of S. 5(8)(b) of the Act, the term "appurtenant" has to be construed not in its primary sense
but in its secondary, non-technical sense such as "usually enjoyed with." The concept indicates something
appurtenant to the lease and not the lease itself. So construed, it would mean "relating to", "adjoining", "an
adjunct or an accessory" to the premises let. Plain meaning of the provision simplicities indicates a nexus
between the premises leased and the premises appurtenant thereto. There has to be a fair and rational
correlation between the two. Premises to be appurtenant must be premises inevitably implied in and essential
to the use and enjoyment of the premises let. Not a constituent part of the lease, but necessary for the
convenient enjoyment of the lease and, therefore, intended to be "premises" within its definition in S. 5(8)(b)
of the Act.
8. Considered in this contact, what would be the position here? Is it possible, reasonably speaking, to hold that
the open space in the compound on the ground floor of the suit building is appurtenant tot he leased room on
the first floor? The obvious answer is no. The very location of the leased premise on the first floor negatives
the defendant's case. After all, to what extent can the term "appurtenant" go? Can it here be extended tot he
open space in the compound on the ground floor? We think not. Is this ground floor space necessary for the
convenient enjoyment of the room on the first floor? Once again, our answer is no. it would be a misnomer to
describe the ground floor area as appurtenant to the first floor room. The ground floor area neither pertains nor
relates to nor adjoins the first floor room. Nor can it legitimately be said that the ground floor area is usually
enjoyed or occupied with the first floor room. It is neither an adjunct nor an accessory nor an appendage qua
the first floor room.
9. Coming to the authorities cited before the learned single Judge, we feel, with great respect, that it would not
be correct to infer an conclude therefrom in favour of the defendant. Apart from the position that altogether
different were the facts as also the context in which the question arose in those cases, even the broad ratio
emerging therefrom does not help the defendant here. Indeed, it supports the plaintiffs. If the "appurtenant"
premise is actually let out, then of course, irrespective of whether it is or is not appurtenant, it obviously is
part and parcel of the lease itself. That was precisely the position in Trim v. Sturminister Rural District
Moraji Goculdas Deoji Trust And ... vs Madhav Vithal Kudwa on 23 November, 1982
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1704232/ 3Council, (1938) 2 KB 508, where the ten acres of grass land ahd been actually let out for years past along with
the cottage, garden and orchard as one unit initially to a dairy farmer and thereafter to a poultry farmer. Yet,
even so, when later on ---- apparently after the expiry of the lease --- question arose whether these ten acres
were appurtenant to the cottage, garden and orchard, it was held that:
"................. The learned county judge was wrong in holding that the word 'appurtenances' included the ten
acres. How much of the adjacent land ought to be included in the word 'appurtenances,' depends on the facts
of the particular case."
It is difficult, therefore. to see how this case can be of any help to the defendant. On the contrary, the ruling
goes to show that in any event the entire ten acres of land was not appurtenant to the cottage, garden and
orchard in question. And to determine on the facts and circumstances of that case how much of the adjacent
land could be legitimately called appurtenant, the matter was sent back to the county judge.
10. In the Madras ruling J. High. Irani v. Chidambaran Chettiar, , the plaintiff ahd obtained a lease of the suit
land excluding the theatre thereon known as Gaiety Theatre which was owned by defendant No. 1. The land
lease in favour of the plaintiff was to come into effect after termination of the subsisting lease in favour of
defendant No. 1. As defendant No. 1 did not remove the theatre structure and did not give vacant possession
of the land, the plaintiff filed suit to recover vacant possession after removal of the theatre structure.
Defendant No. 1 contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to evict him because what was leased to him
(defendant No. 1) viz.. the suit land, was a "building" within the meaning of S. 2(1) of the Madras Buildings
(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 and he (defendant No. 1) was, therefore, protected by the said Act and not
liable to be evicted by way of such a suit. In that case, the definition of "building" in S. 2 (1) of the aforesaid
Act meant not only any building as such' but also included the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any,
appurtenant thereto. Thus, ground or land appurtenant to a building was also itself a building under the Act.
The learned trial Judge dismissed the suit holding (at p. 652):
"Having regard to the wide connotation that was given to the word 'building', the purpose for which the
Madras Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act was enacted the nature of the structures in the suit premises
and the manner in which the entire premises were being let out and used for a number of years. at any rate.
from 1914, and the purpose for which the building was taken on rent by the lessee from time to time leave no
doubt in my mind that the suit premises come within the meaning of the word 'building' under the Madras
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946".
In the plaintiff's appeal, the Division Bench affirmed this finding and conclusion. It was held that a building
consisted not only of the superstructure (theatre) but also the site on which it stood and in which its foundation
is erected. Therefore, what in substance was let to defendant No. 1 was the entire property including the land
on which the theatre stood and which land formed part of the building. (See paragraph 13 of the ruling). It was
further held that the ground, if any, appurtenant to a building was included in the definition of "building" in
the Act. Consequently, if the entire ground was occupied for continuing the superstructure (theatre) along with
the lessor's building and the whole treated as one unit, the site may be treated as an appurtenance in the
secondary sense of the word. (See paragraph 15 of the ruling). Again, in paragraph 26 of the ruling. it was
observed thus:
"In my opinion the word 'appurtenant' occurring in the definition of 'building' in the Act with which we are
concerned is used in the broad secondary and non technical sense of 'relating to', 'usually enjoyed or occupied
with' and 'adjoining' just noticed by me. The idea of the legislature seems to be that if grounds appurtenant to
the building in this sense are let along with the building they should stand attracted to the operation of the
Act."
11. As in Trim's case (1938) 2 KB 508, so also in this case, it is difficult to see how it supports the defendant.
On the contrary and shorn of factors and elements not relevant hereto, the decision and ratio thereof favours
Moraji Goculdas Deoji Trust And ... vs Madhav Vithal Kudwa on 23 November, 1982
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1704232/ 4the plaintiffs. There is, indeed, a word of difference between a land adjoining or adjacent to or underneath a
structure as in the Madras ruling and land on the ground floor in relation to a room on the first floor as in the
present case. The former is a clear instance of land being appurtenant to the structure and the latter equally so
a clear instance but to the contrary viz., the land on the ground floor by no stretch being appurtenant to the
room on the first floor. Again, as in the Madras ruling, here also the word "appurtenant" is used in the
secondary sense. Thus, the authorities sought to be relied upon by the defendant do not really help him but
rather aid the plaintiffs. The principle of both these authorities runs counter to his case. His case is also not
based on any recognised principle of law. It also stands unsupported by any binding authority. It also cannot
be reconciled with justice. We, therefore, conclude this aspect against him and hold that the open space in the
compound of the suit building is not appurtenant to the leased suit room on the first floor and, therefore, does
not constitute "premises" within the meaning of S. 5(8)(b) of the Act.
12. Yet another ground on which the defendant claimed right to park his car -- and which claim also was
upheld by the learned single Judge -- was that car parking was an essential service within the meaning of S.
24(1) of the Act. We are afraid, here also, with great respect, we are unable to agree. S. 24(1) reads thus:
"No landlord either himself or through any person acting or purporting to act on his behalf shall without just
or sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the
premises let to him."
Now, to attract the said provision, the supply or service must be essential; it must have been, without just and
sufficient cause, cut off or withheld; it must have been enjoyed by the tenant; and it must be in respect of the
premises let to him. It is only on the fulfillment of these minimum ingredients that a case under S. 24(1) can
be said to have been made out. The defendant has failed to establish these conditions. In the first place, car
parking is itself not an essential supply or service. In objecting thereto. there is no question, therefore, of
cutting off or withholding any essential supply or service. What is more, on the facts here, car parking cannot
be said to be a service or supply:
"............. enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the premises let to him."
within the meaning of S. 24(1) of the Act. The said provision has thus no application to the present case.
Reliance placed thereon by the defendant can, therefore, be of no avail.
13. The defendant thus fails to prove that he has, as a result of either S. 5(8)(b) or S. 24(1) of the Act, a
statutory right to park his car in the suit compound. Even under the general law, we see no such right in him.
And finally, his plea of permission to park has also rightly stood rejected. The suit, being an action in trespass,
had been rightly decreed. Its reversal in appeal would, therefore, have to be rectified.
14. In the result, this appeal under the Letters Patent succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and
decree in First Appeal No. 449 of 1971 is set aside and the decree passed by the trial Court in Suit No. 8776 is
restored and confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs of this
appeal.
15. Appeal allowed.